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The lack of identified exposures in 2 of the 11 cases of
bioterrorism-related inhalation anthrax in 2001 raised
uncertainty about the infectious dose and transmission of
Bacillus anthracis. We used the Wells-Riley mathematical
model of airborne infection to estimate 1) the exposure
concentrations in postal facilities where cases of inhalation
anthrax occurred and 2) the risk for infection in various
hypothetical scenarios of exposure to B. anthracis
aerosolized from contaminated mail in residential settings.
These models suggest that a small number of cases of
inhalation anthrax can be expected when large numbers of
persons are exposed to low concentrations of B. anthracis.
The risk for inhalation anthrax is determined not only by
bacillary virulence factors but also by infectious aerosol
production and removal rates and by host factors.
T
he intentional release of Bacillus anthracis spores
through the mail in the United States in the fall of 2001
was associated with inhalation anthrax in 11 persons, 5
(45%) of whom died (1,2). Seven cases were associated
with occupational exposures in the postal service, and two
case-patients had documented exposures to contaminated
mail in the business office of a media company. No sources
of exposure were identified for two women who were pre-
sumably exposed to secondarily contaminated mail.
B. anthracis was previously known to have potential as
a weapon on battlefields or for large-scale outdoor dissem-
ination. Its delivery through the mail moved the risk
indoors. We sought to improve our knowledge of indoor
transmission of B. anthracis by applying principles and
methods used in studies of tuberculosis. Although room
ventilation and other environmental factors are known to
be important in the airborne transmission of
Mycobacterium tuberculosis, little attention has been
given to these factors in the transmission of B. anthracis.
We used a mathematical model of airborne infection to
theoretically assess risk for infection with B. anthracis
from indoor exposures; to demonstrate the relative impor-
tance of pathogen, environmental, and host factors in
transmission; and to estimate a range of infectious doses
on the basis of these models and the epidemiology of the
2001 anthrax cases. 
Methods
We reviewed the literature in English on inhalation
anthrax by searching MEDLINE electronically and by
obtaining articles cited in references in these and older arti-
cles. We focused on occupational cases and outbreaks and
on experimental aerosol exposures of nonhuman primates
that included environmental sampling data. We used the
Wells-Riley modification of the Soper and Reed-Frost
models of infection as our mathematical model of airborne
infection (3–5). This equation can be arranged so that the
probability of airborne infection is given by P (infect) =
C/S=1-exp(-Iqtp/Q), where C is the number of cases
among S persons susceptible to the infection; I is the num-
ber of sources of infection; q is the number of “quanta,” or
units of bacilli necessary to cause infection produced per
source per unit of time; t is the time of exposure per unit of
time; p is the minute ventilation rate of the exposed sus-
ceptible hosts in volume per unit of time; and Q is the vol-
umetric rate of fresh air ventilation that removes the
infectious aerosol in volume per unit of time. Units used
were cubic feet and minutes. Biologically, a quantum may
be one or more spores in one or more airborne particles,
analogous to a colony-forming unit on a culture plate.
Statistically, a quantum is the amount of infectious materi-
al needed to produce infection in 63% of uniformly
exposed animals, or 1.25 times the median infectious dose,
i.e., q = 1.25 x ID50 (5). We modeled transmission of infec-
tion from contaminated mail in two general environments:
1) the workplace of mail distribution centers and 2) home
or office exposures.  
Using published attack rates of inhalation anthrax of
0.25% (2/750) and 0.66% (4/610) in two U.S. Postal
Service (USPS) processing and distribution centers in New
Jersey (6) and Washington, D.C. (7), respectively, we esti-
mated the quanta produced for a range of available work-
place ventilation rates by using the Wells-Riley equation
above and solving for q. Data on the size and ventilation of
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obtained from a USPS ventilation engineering contractor
(C. Hong, pers. comm.). For the exposures in the USPS
postal distribution centers, we assumed an exposure time
of 8 hours to represent a work shift and a pulmonary ven-
tilation rate of 14.6 L/min (0.5156 ft3/min), as might be
expected with moderate work. This rate is comparable to
the rate used to estimate inhaled doses in a study of an
anthrax outbreak that occurred in a goat hair–processing
mill in Manchester, New Hampshire, in 1957 (8). 
We also estimated the risks for airborne infection asso-
ciated with hypothetical exposures to B. anthracis that
might have occurred during the handling and opening of
contaminated mail in a home or office. For the first of
these modeling scenarios, we used room dimensions of 12
ft x 18 ft x 8 ft (3.7 m x 5.5 m x 2.4 m), or a volume of
2,160 ft3 (61 m3), which is a reasonable size for an office
or room in a home and allows for comparison to modeling
data on occupational tuberculosis. We then modeled the
risks for exposure in a smaller room of 56 ft2 x 8 ft high
(432 ft3, 12.2 m3) and for exposure as a result of dispersion
throughout a median-sized U.S. house, which has a vol-
ume of 10,947.5 ft3 (310 m3) (9). 
We modeled room ventilation rates of 0.5 and 2 air
changes per hour that correspond to 18 ft3 and 72 ft3 (0.5
m3 and 2.0 m3) per minute. This rate approximates a cur-
rent standard for fresh air ventilation of 20 ft3/min (0.57
m3/min) per occupant for office space and 15 ft3/min (0.42
m3/min) per person for residential living areas, if one
assumes that only one person occupied the room (10). We
assumed duration of exposure of 1 hour to simulate an
exposure occurring with the opening of contaminated mail
with gradual dispersion of the aerosol. We included pul-
monary ventilation rates of 4 L/min, 6 L/min, and 10
L/min for exposed persons to span the range of minute-
ventilation reported in the literature for persons at rest
(11–13).
Because our review of the literature did not provide a
conclusive infectious dose for humans, we followed the
approach first suggested by Wells (4,5) of using units of
quanta to represent the unit required to establish infection,
as has been used in studies of tuberculosis and measles
(4,14). Since the infectious dose of inhaled virulent
anthrax spores cannot ethically be determined experimen-
tally in humans, we estimated the 50% infectious dose
(ID50) based on data from the 8-hour inhaled dose meas-
ured in Manchester in 1957. The inhalation dose for work-
ers in the area where four of the five cases of inhalation
anthrax had occurred was estimated to be 140–690 spores
<5 µm in size (and 620–2,200 total spores), based on air
sampling data (8). Sixteen presumably susceptible workers
were in this area (15), so this estimate may be considered
an ID25, since 25% of the exposed persons were infected.
On the basis of studies of 1,236 monkeys, Glassman esti-
mated the median lethal dose to be 4,130 spores, and using
the probit model he suggested that the LD25 was associat-
ed with a 10-fold decrease in dose (16). When this princi-
ple is applied, a 10-fold increase of the ID25 for the
Manchester mill outbreak would result in an ID50 of 1,400
to 6,900 spores <5 µm, or 6,200–22,000 total spores (8).
This number is similar to Glassman’s estimate and to the
lower range of the LD50, 2,500–55,000, accepted by an
expert panel (17). Since q = 1.25 x ID50, then one quanta
under these assumptions is 1,750–8,625 spores <5  µm
(7,750–27,500 total spores).
The number of persons exposed to B. anthracis spores
through the mail in the fall of 2001 is unknown, so we arbi-
trarily expressed the probability for infection as the num-
ber infected per 10,000 population. Estimates of the
numbers of persons infected can be calculated by using
these estimates. For example, if approximately 5,000 per-
sons were exposed to contaminated letters as might be sug-
gested by the modeling data of Webb and Blaser, these
risks can be divided by two. All data were entered, stored,
and analyzed by using JMP-SAS software (version 4.0.4,
SAS Institute, Cary, NC.)
Results
Inhalation anthrax developed in two of the 750 persons
working in the USPS processing and distribution centers in
Trenton, New Jersey, for an overall attack rate of 0.25%
(6). The workroom is 151,200 ft2, with a height of 15 ft, for
a total volume of 2,268,000 ft3 (C. Hong, pers. comm.).
The area is ventilated with 5.29 air changes per hour, with
a minimum of 11.8% and a maximum of 100% of fresh air.
Therefore, the nonrecirculated air-ventilation rate varies
from a minimum of 23,596 ft3/min to a maximum of
199,962 ft3/min. Solving for q results in an exposure of
0.238 to 2.08 infectious quanta per minute, or 114 to 998
infectious quanta generated per 8-hour shift. If one
assumes that one quantum is 1,750–8,625 spores <5 µm
(7,750–27,500 total spores), then the 8-hour cumulative
production of infectious aerosol is estimated to have
ranged from 199,500 to 8,607,750 spores <5  µm
(883,500–27,445,000 total spores).
Similar calculations were performed for the processing
and distribution center in Washington, D.C., where
inhalation anthrax developed in 4 of 610 workers (attack
rate 0.66%). The workroom is 4,605,000 ft3 (C. Hong,
pers. comm.) and is ventilated at 2.88 air changes per
hour, with a minimum of 16.2% outside air. The calculat-
ed ventilation rate is 35,809–221,040 ft3/min, resulting in
a range of q of 0.96–6.0 infectious units per minute, or
461–2,880 quanta per 8-hour shift. When the same
assumptions of the number of bacilli per quantum are
used, the 8-hour cumulative production of infectious
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79,200,000 total spores).
The risks for airborne infection to susceptible occu-
pants in our hypothetical scenarios of exposure in a home
or office are summarized in the Table and plotted in the
Figure. The risks for infection associated with exposure to
one quantum in these models is 6–936 per 10,000 persons.
If the exposure concentration decreases by one log, i.e., to
0.1 quantum, the risk decreases to 0.6–98 per 10,000 per-
sons. At exposure concentrations >0.1 quantum, the risks
are >6 cases per 10,000 and increase to very large magni-
tudes.  
If 1 quantum is 1,750–8,625 spores <5 µm, then inhaled
doses corresponding to lower exposures can be calculated:
0.1 quantum would be 175–863 bacilli, 0.01 quantum
would be 18–86 bacilli, and 0.001 quantum would be 2–9
bacilli. Exposures estimates <0.001 quantum are biologi-
cally meaningless under these assumptions since fractions
of spores are not viable.
Changes in room size and ventilation rate affect risk
more than changes in pulmonary ventilation in these sce-
narios. The relative risk reduction associated with an
increase of room ventilation from 0.5 to 2 air changes per
hour is highest for low-concentration exposures and
decreases with increasing concentration of the aerosol
exposure. For example, in the scenario of a high-concentra-
tion exposure of 100 quanta and the exposed person’s
breathing 10 L/min in the moderate-size room with 0.5 air
changes per hour, improving ventilation to 2.0 air changes
per hour decreases the risk by 55%. However, if the same
person is exposed to 0.1 quantum in the same room with the
same changes in ventilation, the risk decreases by 75%. As
expected, for a given exposure concentration and pul-
monary ventilation rate, the lowest risk is in the large, well-
ventilated space and the highest risk is in the small, poorly
ventilated room. For example, if exposure is 1 quantum of
infection to a person breathing 6 L/min, the risk in the
small, poorly ventilated room is 58.9 per 10,000 and in the
large, well-ventilated space, the risk is 0.6 per 10,000.
The Figure illustrates that, although the production of
infectious aerosol and the duration of exposure were high-
er for postal workers in the postal distribution center facil-
ities, the greater rate of removal of the infectious aerosol
by dilution ventilation in such facilities results in a lower
risk for infection for a given aerosol production rate (q)
than in the home exposure scenarios.
Discussion
These analyses emphasize that the risks for airborne
infection are determined not only by the virulence of the
agent but also by environmental factors, e.g., room size
and ventilation rates, and host factors, e.g., pulmonary
ventilation rate. Little can be done to change one’s pul-
monary ventilation rate, but these data suggest that risks
for inhalation anthrax are likely to decrease considerably
with fairly modest increases in room ventilation for low-
concentration exposures. These data might be helpful in
educating both the general public and policymakers
regarding strategies to reduce risks from aerosolized
bioweapons.
General dilution ventilation reduces the risk of trans-
mitting airborne pathogens; however, as described for M.
tuberculosis, room ventilation is theoretically limited in
decreasing this risk, especially when the exposure concen-
tration is high (14). UV germicidal irradiation has been
suggested as a potential bioterrorism countermeasure (18).
Although we are not aware of data regarding the use of
irradiation to inactivate B. anthracis, Peng and colleagues
found that UV germicidal irradiation of upper-room air
reduced B. subtilis spore concentrations by 46% to 80%,
depending on the ventilation rate (19). Thus, further
research on the use of UV germicidal irradiation and other
interventions seems warranted. 
These modeling data suggest that approximately
0.7–63.4 million total airborne spores and approximately
0.2–20 million spores <5 µm may have been produced by
contaminated mail during work shifts at the two USPS pro-
cessing and distribution centers where inhalation anthrax
developed in postal workers. These data are plausible,
given the contamination with B. anthracis documented by
environmental sampling of both the New Jersey and the
Washington, D.C., facilities (6,20). Although the results of
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Table. Risk for airborne infection with Bacillus anthracis modeled for various scenarios of exposure to secondarily contaminated mail 
for 1 hour in a home or office, expressed as number of cases per 10,000 susceptible persons exposed
a 
  Small room 0.5 ACH  Moderate-size room  0.5 ACH  Moderate-size room  2 ACH  House 2 ACH 
Quanta  PV 10 L/min  PV 10 L/min  PV 6 L/min  PV 4 L/min  PV 10 L/min  PV 6 L/min  PV 4 L/min  PV 4 L/min 
0.001  1.0  0.2  0.1  0.1  0.05  0.03  0.02  0.006 
0.01  9.8  2.0  1.2  0.8  0.5  0.3  0.2  0.1 
0.1  97.8  19.6  11.8  7.9  4.9  3.0  2.0  0.6 
1  936  195  117  78  49  30  20  6 
10  6,256  1,784  1,113  756  479  291  195  61 
100  10,000  8,599  6,928  5,443  3,881  2,555  1,784  596 
1,000  10,000  10,000  9,999  9,996  9,926  9,477  8,598  4,588 
aACH, air changes per hour; PV, pulmonary ventilation. air sampling were negative, dust samples grew 3–9.7 mil-
lion CFU/g (20). A contaminated letter in Washington,
D.C., purportedly contained 2 g powder with 100 billion to
1 trillion spores per gram (21), which suggests that letters
can be a source of infectious material.
These data also suggest that a few cases of inhalation
anthrax can be expected if large numbers of people are
exposed to a virulent strain at low concentrations within
homes or offices. We will probably never know how many
persons were exposed to mail contaminated with B.
anthracis in the fall of 2001. If 10,000 persons were
exposed in a home or office to secondarily contaminated
mail, and two persons were infected, these models suggest
that exposure was probably to 0.1 or 0.01 quantum, or
18–863 airborne spores. Above and below that range of
exposures, the number estimated to be infected is very
large or very small. Even if 1,000 persons were exposed,
this range of exposures appears most reasonable, except
for exposures to 1 quantum in larger or well-ventilated
environments.  
Glassman suggested that 100 spores may be sufficient to
cause infection (16), and a more recent analysis suggested
that as few as 1–3 spores may be sufficient to cause infec-
tion (22). Our data are consistent with these conclusions, as
0.001 quantum would be 2 to 9 bacilli in our model.
We assumed in our analyses that the strain used in the
mailings was at least as virulent as the strain reported in
the outbreak of inhalation anthrax at the Manchester mill
(15). Genomic analysis recently identified the isolate used
in the mailings as the Ames strain, which is used in multi-
ple research laboratories (23). However, the strain was pre-
pared for aerosolization in powder form, and we are not
aware of published data on infectious doses for powdered
preparations. The method of preparing bacilli for
aerosolization may affect retention of aerosolized agents
and their virulence of B. anthracis. For example, the sur-
face-active compound Tergitol was found to increase viru-
lence 10-fold in guinea pigs (24).
The two women with no identified exposures in the
recent bioterrorism-related outbreak may have been
unusually susceptible to inhalation anthrax. Risk factors
for increased susceptibility or resistance to inhalation
anthrax are not known, although age has been suggested
(25). One of these women was 61 years old (2), and the
other was 94 years old (1). Aging is associated with a
decrease in mucociliary clearance as well as alterations in
immune responses, but given the large numbers of elderly
persons who were likely exposed to contaminated mail,
age alone seems inadequate to explain the epidemiology of
this outbreak. We are reluctant to accept that children are
less susceptible than elderly adults without additional data.
Previous reports of cases associated with industrial sources
or with materials contaminated by B. anthracis suggest
that some susceptible persons, including children, were
infected during relatively brief exposures (26–28). We
speculate that the combination of thin body type, age, and
female sex might be a risk factor for inhalation anthrax, as
it is for pulmonary infections with environmental nontu-
berculous mycobacteria, e.g., with M. avium complex (29).
Women with asymptomatic bronchial hyperresponsiveness
have increased deposition of inhaled particles of ≈1 µm
(30), but we are not aware of data that show this to be a
risk factor for respiratory infections.
Modeling studies of transmission of tuberculosis or
measles have usually assumed a single uniform pulmonary
ventilation rate in exposed persons as well as a homoge-
nous concentration of infectious aerosol over time and
space. Riley’s choice of 10 L/min to model human ventila-
tion has been used by other modelers (14), but we have
added a broader range of values to assess the relative
importance of variability in minute ventilation. However,
human ventilation is not uniform, being punctuated by
sighs in which the tidal volume may be three times greater
than the volume at rest (12). If a piece of contaminated
mail were opened, aerosol was likely concentrated imme-
diately afterwards and in the immediate vicinity. Thus, if a
person were to sigh when exposed to the maximum num-
ber of airborne spores, spores would likely deposit in
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Figure. Risk for airborne infection with Bacillus anthracis in various
scenarios. Home and office exposures are for 1 hour, and postal
facility exposures are for 8 hours; for postal facilities, the models
assume a 14.6 L/min pulmonary ventilation rate with moderate
work, comparable to the rate used to estimate inhaled doses in the
Manchester study. ACH, air changes per hour.greater concentration. However, we are not aware of data
documenting deposition associated with short-term irregu-
larities in ventilation. This is another area for further
research. 
Druett first applied the probit model in early studies of
inhalation anthrax in animal models (31). He acknowl-
edged that this model best fit the data within the range of
the LD
25–LD
75 but cautioned about interpreting data out-
side that range. Our concern with estimating the number of
bacilli required to kill roughly 0.1%–1.0% of exposed per-
sons (10–100/10,000) was one of the reasons we chose not
to apply the Druett model. We selected the Wells-Riley
model because of a number of clear and compelling traits.
First, data generated by the Wells-Riley model agree with
observed data in airborne infection with measles and tuber-
culosis (4,5). Neither the Druett model nor other models of
airborne infection with more specified variables and more
complex mathematical forms (32,33) have been validated
against epidemiologic data of any airborne infection.
Second, the Wells-Riley model includes variables for envi-
ronmental conditions and aerosol production rates not
accounted for in the Druett model. Alternative models
might allow for a sigmoidal growth in the probability for
infection, i.e., the probability of infection increases monot-
onically; however, the rate of change first increases to a
maximum and then decreases steadily to zero. While such
a model is biologically plausible, experimental data to jus-
tify such a model are lacking. No models have been vali-
dated for inhalation anthrax in humans, which differs
markedly from pulmonary tuberculosis and measles in its
pathogenesis. 
One possible approach to extending the Wells-Riley
model in the future would be adding a susceptibility factor,
y. With the current model formulation, as q increases, air-
borne infection approaches 100% certainty, i.e., the proba-
bility approaches 1. Increases in the other parameters (I, t,
p and 1/Q) have a similar effect on the probability for air-
borne infection. An alternative model might be given by
C/S = y[1-exp(-Iqtp/Q)] where 0 < y < 1. With such a
model, as any of the parameters I, q, t, p, or 1/Q increase,
the probability of airborne infection approaches 1. The fac-
tor y may be conceived as a fixed or random effect, or one
that is conditional on measurable, individual-level suscep-
tibility factors such as age or coexisting conditions.
Additional data on susceptibility are needed, however,
before such a parameter can be included with confidence. 
Modeling depends on the assumptions used; the most
critical of our assumptions is that all affected persons were
exposed to similar quanta of B. anthracis from contaminat-
ed mail. More likely, the number of quanta decreased with
“postal distance” from the index letters. Webb and Blaser
allowed for this possibility by modeling the cross-contam-
ination of letters resulting from contact with index letters
passing through a prototypical postal system (25). Their
model, however, did not allow for the environmental con-
siderations that can mediate between aerosolization and
infection. The Wells-Riley model allows for environmen-
tal considerations, and it can be adapted to variable expo-
sure scenarios by stratifying by persons sharing a common
quantum of exposure. To do that would require further
modeling assumptions in the fashion of those made by
Webb and Blaser. Epidemiologic data will likely never
become available to test the validity of any of these mod-
els, but this modeling exercise demonstrates how the risk
for infection is sensitive not only to the infectious dose but
also to environmental parameters.
Conclusion
The risk for airborne infection with B. anthracis is
determined not only by the virulence of the organism but
also by the balance between infectious aerosol production
and removal, pulmonary ventilation rate, duration of expo-
sure, and host susceptibility factors. Dilution ventilation of
the indoor environment is an important determinant of the
risk for infection. Enhanced room ventilation, UV germi-
cidal irradiation, and other engineering control measures
may be used to decrease the risk for infection. Although
much research focuses on bacillary factors to improve our
understanding of the pathogenesis of inhalation anthrax,
our modeling data emphasize the need to better understand
the complex interactions among host susceptibility factors,
environmental factors, transmission mechanisms, and
dose-response relationships in determining the risk of air-
borne infection with B. anthracis and other agents of
bioterrorism.
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